Central African Republic

Africa

GDP per Capita ($)
$510.6
Population (in 2021)
5.2 million

Assessment

Country Risk
D
Business Climate
E
Previously
D
Previously
E

suggestions

Summary

Strengths

  • Forestry and mining resources (diamonds, gold) and agricultural potential (cotton, coffee)
  • Importance of multilateral financial support and remittances from the diaspora
  • Member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Weaknesses

  • Political and institutional fragility in an extremely unstable post-civil war security context, with much of the territory still outside government control
  • Low economic diversification and dependence on exports of a few raw materials (timber, gold and diamonds)
  • Illegal mining and logging, as well as corruption, which are detrimental to public revenues
  • Poor transport, ICT and energy supply infrastructure in a landlocked country
  • Dependence on food and oil imports
  • Majority of the population living in extreme poverty (65.7% in 2023), underdeveloped health and education systems
  • CFA franc pegged to the euro, but the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) has limited common reserves

Trade exchanges

Exportof goods as a % of total

Pakistan
41%
United Arab Emirates
30%
Europe
15%
Cameroon
5%
Mexico
2%

Importof goods as a % of total

Cameroon 32 %
32%
Europe 16 %
16%
China 10 %
10%
United States of America 10 %
10%
India 9 %
9%

Outlook

The economic outlook highlights the opportunities and risks ahead, helping to anticipate major changes. This analysis is essential for any company seeking to adapt to changes in the business environment.

Timid recovery driven by exports and infrastructure projects financed by the international community

Compared to 2024, which saw an end to stagnation, growth is expected to accelerate in 2025 and again in 2026. The drivers of 2024’s economic growth, notably improved fuel supplies and the resilience of forestry, are continuing to stimulate the economy. Added to this is an increase in exports – both in volume and value – of gold, timber and diamonds. The latter product benefits from the lifting of international sanctions thanks to tighter state control over mining areas and increased traceability efforts. Furthermore, the import bill is falling, thanks in particular to Russia's donation of 30,000 tons of diesel in early 2025, which is equivalent to six months of domestic consumption, and to lower oil prices.

Growth is also driven by a recovery in private investment, supported by the rollout of the 4G network and the initial benefits of the Corridor 13 infrastructure project, which aims to establish a multimodal transport network between Pointe-Noire (Congo-Brazzaville) and N'Djamena (Chad), via Bangui. These investments in infrastructure, as well as in agribusiness, are mainly financed by international financial institutions, as budgetary constraints and low domestic savings weigh on the country's self-financing capacity. However, public consumption will remain sluggish, as the government aims to reduce its primary deficit, i.e., excluding debt interest. Furthermore, private consumption will benefit from easing inflation but will remain crimped by high poverty and the elimination of tax exemptions. Last, the reduction in US development aid (USAID) will have a more moderate impact than expected on economic activity in 2025, as humanitarian projects have been maintained and a large part of the initially planned amount has already been disbursed. However, the food situation remains extremely worrying.

Inflation, which accelerated in late 2024 and early 2025 due to a supply shock affecting food products and rising fuel prices, is expected to continue easing on back of lower prices at the pump and fuel donations from Russia. Given that inflation is under control and in order to support regional growth, the BEAC (Bank of Central African States) decided in March 2025 to lower its rates (tender rates and marginal lending facility rates), against the advice of the IMF.

Strained budgetary situation

In 2024, the primary deficit, excluding foreign-financed investments (5% of GDP), worsened to 4.9% of GDP due to the postponement of planned expenditure in 2023, the settlement of arrears and increased security expenditure. Over the past year and a half, subscription rates for bond issues on the regional market have fallen owing to a decline in liquidity caused by credit events in certain CEMAC member countries (excessive public deficits and debt). As a result, the government has resorted to syndicated debt issues, i.e., loans negotiated with a group of banks or investors at regional level. These loans are more expensive to service.

To remedy the growing public debt and deficit, the budget policy for 2025 and 2026 aims to stabilise public spending at around USD 600 million in order to reduce its share of GDP from 20% in 2024 to around 16.5% in 2026. To this end, the government is seeking to slightly reduce current expenditure (salaries, subsidies, expenditure on goods and services). Capital expenditure will continue to be financed by foreign sources to the tune of 85%. At the same time, various reforms are aimed at increasing revenue: reducing exemptions, recovering arrears and increasing the resources of the tax administration. The government's objective is audacious and resolute: it aims to achieve a balanced budget in 2026 by actions staggered evenly over two years. This would bring public debt below 50% of GDP by 2027. Fifty-three per cent of this debt is held by external creditors in the form of concessional loans (57% multilateral and 43% bilateral). Old arrears to bilateral creditors account for 13% of the debt. The balance is held by domestic and regional creditors. India and China stand out for their recent rise in prominence among the country’s pool of creditors. Despite the heavy burden of servicing debt contracted on the regional market (33% of public revenue in 2026) and a high risk of over-indebtedness, the debt is nonetheless sustainable.

The current account deficit is expected to decline sharply in 2025 and 2026, thanks to an improvement in the trade balance, which has been made possible by the lifting of international sanctions on diamond exports and a reduction in the energy bill, and an increase in budgetary support under the IMF's Extended Credit Facility. The current account deficit is mainly financed by grants for investment projects from multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank) or bilateral partners, such as France. It is marginally financed by concessional loans and direct investments, which are slightly on the rise, as well as commercial credits.

The authorities are asserting their presence a little more in a persistently highly unstable environment

The CAR has been in a precarious political and security situation since the outbreak of civil war in 2013. The peace agreement signed in 2019 between the government and various rebel groups has not delivered on its promises, with parts of the territory remaining under the control of armed groups. However, divisions within the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a movement formed by the merger of six rebel groups in response to the fraudulent re-election of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in 2020, as well as the July 2025 peace agreement between the Central African government and two major militias (part of the CPC), are helping to increase state control over the territory and, consequently, security. Nevertheless, several armed groups are still active, which fuels chronic insecurity in several regions.

The new Constitution passed by a widely boycotted referendum in July 2023 extends the presidential term to seven years, renewable indefinitely, thereby paving the way for President Touadéra to remain in power for the long term, supported by mercenaries from Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) under Russian supervision. Local elections, which have been postponed several times due to logistical and financial difficulties, are scheduled to be held at the end of 2025, at the same time as the presidential and legislative elections, in a closed environment where the opposition is muzzled. Considerable uncertainty remains as to whether they will actually take place. If they do, the announced boycott and the absence of credible observers raise fears of post-election protests and even a resumption of violence in certain areas. Voter turnout is expected to remain very low (probably similar to the 34% recorded in 2020), reflecting the government's limited control over certain parts of the country and widespread public disenchantment with the electoral process. The head of state is also consolidating his grip on major economic issues by assuming control over the granting of mining licences.

Internationally, the CAR maintains strong economic and military ties with Russia, whose militias, which are permanently present in the country, ensure the president's security and train the regular army in exchange for privileged access to the country's resources, namely mines, timber and agriculture. Bangui even went a step further in February 2024 by allowing Moscow to set up its first military base in Africa on its soil, which will be able to accommodate up to 10,000 soldiers. However, recent discussions with Africom (United States Africa Command) suggest that a slight rapprochement with the US is possible, the aim being to strengthen security in the country. In this context, MINUSCA, the UN peacekeeping operation in place in the Central African Republic since 2014, is still going ahead, despite tensions between it and the government, Russian troops and local populations. In January 2025, a French officer was received in Bangui to revive Franco-Central African military cooperation, which had been suspended since 2016, with Paris seeking to counter Russian influence by participating in army training. France also resumed its economic support, disbursing EUR 10 million in aid in November 2024, the first grant in three years. At the same time, border tensions with Chad, which is accused of supporting certain rebel militias, and the influx of refugees since the outbreak of civil war in Sudan in 2023, are complicating regional security management.

Last updated: July 2025

Other country with similar country risk