A vibrant (but polarized) economy
Left to its own devices, the U.S. economy should retain its good shape in 2026. The bulk of the tariff’s costs are being absorbed by firms, which goes a long way to explaining why inflation has so far undershot expectations. Business insolvencies are overshooting pre-pandemic levels, signaling that the weakest firms are struggling to keep up with higher costs even as the strongest firms do very well. Similar polarization dynamics explain why demand for goods and services has remained so strong. Conservative estimates put the share of consumption (70% of GDP) of the wealthiest quintile at 35%; the highest at 50-60%. The wealthier you are, the more exposed you are to the equity market: The top 0.1% hold about 70% of their financial wealth in equities versus 15% to 20% for the bottom 50%. Investor enthusiasm around A.I. therefore isn’t just supporting CAPEX, it is underpinning spending for wealthier Americans. Besides, extra tax refunds from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) should provide a 0.8% boost to household income throughout the year. Likewise, we expect the depreciation and R/D expensing provision to boost capital investment, extending the CAPEX momentum beyond the A.I ecosystem. If anything, we might get too much demand and the convergence to 2% inflation we expect, once tariff pass-through is done, might be postponed.
Two areas should be closely monitored: the stock market and the job market. Potential triggers for an equity correction include a reversal in investor sentiment on A.I., as well as unpredictable policy from a White House afraid of losing Congress in the midterm elections. As for the job market, you would expect the good growth picture to nurse it back to health. But given the strong incentives for technology-driven labor substitution, we’ll call the end of the “low-fire, low-hire” job market when we see it. Worker scarcity will become increasingly manifest in sectors reliant on undocumented labor (construction, food industry, hospitality). The Fed is expected to bring rates closer to 3%, though a pause is not off the cards if inflationary pressures intensify. Despite intensifying pressure from the executive, we don’t expect Fed independence to be concretely compromised as long as it is defended by the Supreme Court. We therefore expect the recovery in construction to be rather protracted and backloaded throughout the year. With the effects of tariff-driven inventory buildup fading, we expect a positive contribution from net exports.
US dollar dominance allows fiscal largesse, external deficits will persist
Were it not for the attractiveness of US government bonds as the world’s benchmark reserve asset, the fiscal trajectory would be cause for imminent concern. Due to a combination of higher interest rates and persistently high primary deficits (3% of GDP), interest expenditure has ballooned from a pre-pandemic average of 1.5% of GDP to 3.1% in 2025 and is expected to rise further as growth normalizes but rates stay high. The largest items of spending (social security, health and defense) will continue to grow amid population ageing, rising medical costs, and the need to modernize and maintain military capabilities. The push for improving government cost-efficiency should be comparatively small, with the largest potential targets for spending being politically sensitive (spending on veterans, opioid crisis, housing assistance), while cuts to civil service headcount can only go so far. The OBBBA, which introduces wide-reaching tax cuts while only partially reducing spending (healthcare, food aid and green energy subsidies), should result in a net increase of USD 3-3.7 tn. to the federal debt over the next ten years. Tariffs have proven a useful instrument to raise revenue (USD 273 bn. in 2025, 0.9% of GDP), but not at a scale that will meaningfully offset broader deficitary pressures. Furthermore, a Supreme Court ruling curtailing the political legitimacy of a large share of the current tariff regime would introduce a revenue gap. Given the Republican party’s strong incentive to appease economic concerns going into the midterms, there is upside risk to expenditure, for example the proposal to distribute USD 2 000 “tariff rebate checks” to households. We see potential for continued growing pressure on sovereign rates in the medium term.
Despite some reduction, the country will continue to accumulate large current account deficits for the foreseeable future. First, the good health of the consumer will yield persistent demand for imports, but on the other hand, foreign investment should continue flowing into the economy, while the aforementioned additional deficit spending will create financing requirements. Tariffs could create a reduction of overall imports in the very short run, but trade partner diversification should progressively offset that effect. The US’s external “vulnerabilites” would only become an issue if the statuses of the dollar as reserve currency and treasuries as safe haven assets were to significantly erode. There have been, arguably, some early signs of this in 2025, but it’s early to tell if it is a blip or a trend.
“America first” foreign policy, risks to Fed independence
President Donald Trump and the Republican party secured a decisive victory in the November 2024 elections, winning the presidency by a comfortable margin in the electoral college (312/538 votes) and in both houses of Congress (220/435 House seats, 53/100 Senate seats). Given the very slim 5-seat majority, the record number of representatives retiring (43), the high number of competitive districts (42), and the tendency for incumbents to be sanctioned in midterm elections; the House stands good chances of flipping Democrat. Republicans stand better chances of keeping the Senate, but it is also at risk. Majorities in both chambers have been crucial for passing flagship policies, such as extending and expanding the 2017 tax cuts, boosting budget for immigration enforcement, restricting eligibility conditions for Medicaid, and rolling back clean energy and EV tax credits. Most types of legislation also require 60 votes in the Senate, giving Democrats some power to obstruct policy and occasionally leading to government shutdowns. The Supreme Court leans Republican (6-3), and its commitment to act as a check on executive power is being challenged by the White House willing to test boundaries. The President is also pressuring the Fed to lower rates further than it would otherwise. Between 1 and 3 seats of the 12 in the Fed policymaking committee will be replaced by the President in 2026, including the Chairperson. This would not be enough to control the committee, even if all Trump appointees follow the President’s lead. Though there is still some margin before the Fed’s independence is compromised, it is getting thinner.
An expansion of the tariff regime should not be ruled out, given the president’s predilection for this tool. However, we’d expect additional tariffs to be piecemeal compared to all those that were added in 2025, or used to reconstitute tariff regimes ruled unlawful. The relationship with China is a major source of potential instability. There is a deep-rooted strategic competition between both superpowers. Both sides have used a variety of tools to pressure their rival’s economy (tariffs, currency manipulation, industrial subsidies, export restrictions of critical inputs such as semiconductors and rare earth minerals). At the time of writing, the relationship is undergoing relative détente, with a trade truce set to expire in November 2026. However, this state of affairs can be quickly reversed. The US will continue to seek decoupling from China in trade and finance, while reinforcing geopolitical influence in the Western Hemisphere, as shown most emblematically by rapidly escalating involvement in Venezuela and aspirations to acquire Greenland. The July 2026 USMCA review will redefine the terms of the trade relation with Canada and Mexico; the US’s main trading partners (20% of total trade). Our working assumption is that the agreement will survive, though it is harder to say if in the form of a full extension (from 2036 to 2042) or subject to another revision in 2027. The push for deregulation, especially regarding environment and reporting / compliance, is expected to continue and will result in less red tape for businesses.

Canada
Europe
Mexico
China
United Kingdom
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